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ARTICLES
SECURITIES ARBITRATIONS INVOLVING
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES AND
COLLATERALIZED MORTGAGE OBLIGATIONS:
SUITABLE FOR UNSUITABILITY CLAIMS?
Bradley J. Bondi ∗
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Over the past two years, the world has witnessed the unfolding of
the “subprime mortgage crisis”. A steep rise in home foreclosures beginning in late 2006 caused a ripple effect throughout the economy,
resulting in a dearth of liquidity across the lending sector. The largest
rise in defaults occurred on so-called “subprime” 1 and other adjustable
rate mortgages (ARMs). 2 These types of mortgages were offered initial∗

Bradley J. Bondi is counsel to a commissioner at the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and serves as an adjunct professor at George Mason University
School of Law where he teaches Advanced Securities Regulation. The SEC, as a matter
of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its
employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Commission, any commissioner, or of the author’s colleagues
upon the staff of the Commission. Prior to joining the SEC, the author was a partner
with Kirkland & Ellis LLP and, prior to that, an associate with Williams & Connolly
LLP. The author wishes to thank Professor Steven Varholik of Georgetown University
Law Center for his advice and support. Any errors or omissions, however, are the
author’s own.
1. A subprime mortgage is a loan having a higher interest rate and suboptimal
terms than a traditional loan. A subprime mortgage is obtained usually by persons who
do not qualify for a traditional loan due to poor credit scores, a history of default, or
other negative factors. See Danielle DiMartino & John V. Duca, The Fed. Reserve
Bank of Dallas, The Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages, ECON. LETTER, Vol. 2, No.
11, at 2 (Nov. 2007), available at http://dallasfed.org/research/eclett/2007/el0711.pdf.
2. An adjustable rate mortgage is a type of mortgage where the interest rate varies
according to a specific benchmark. See Investopedia.com, Adjustable-Rate Mortgage
(ARM), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/arm.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). The
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ly during a time of rising housing prices, often to unqualified borrowers, 3 who thought that they would later have the opportunity to refinance
at more favorable terms. As housing prices declined, however, refinancing became more difficult; defaults increased sharply as interest
rates reset at higher rates on many of the mortgages. 4 These events
contributed to approximately 1.3 million foreclosures in 2007, an
increase of approximately 75% from 2006. 5 Foreclosures increased to
2.3 million in 2008, an increase of approximately 80% from 2007. 6
Some experts have estimated that subprime defaults ultimately will
reach between $200 billion and $300 billion before the crisis ends. 7
Mortgage lenders and banks – which maintained the mortgages on
their balance sheets, and thereby retained the credit risk – suffered the
first losses. Other financial institutions avoided large losses, however,
by passing along the credit risk to investors through securitization of the
mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralized
mortgage obligations (CMOs). These investment products, in turn, were
purchased by retail and institutional investors, often following a recommendation by a broker-dealer.
MBSs are asset-backed securities having cash flows backed by the

mortgage industry (primarily thrift institutions) developed adjustable rate mortgages to
control against the risk to lenders associated with interest rates. See Thomas P.
Vartanian, Counseling Participants in the Development of New Financial Products,
Services, and Techniques, Practising Law Inst., PLI Order No. A4-4134 73, 169 (1985).
ARMs gained popularity in the United States around 1980. See id. at 170.
3. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2007) (describing predatory
lending practices where lenders make loans to borrowers who they know cannot afford
the monthly payments).
4. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Speech at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and
Competition: The Subprime Mortgage Market (May 17, 2007) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke20070517a.htm)
(discussing the multiple causes of subprime adjustable-rate mortgage delinquencies);
see also DiMartino & Duca supra note 1, at 1, 5.
5. Press Release, RealtyTrac Inc., U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 75 Percent
in 2007 (Jan. 29, 2008), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/
pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID=3988&accnt=64847.
6. Press Release, RealtyTrac Inc., U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 81 Percent
in 2008 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/
pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID=5681&accnt=64847.
7. See Postcards from the Ledge, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 2007, at 10.
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principal and interest payments of a pool of mortgage loans. 8 Payments
are made periodically over the lifetime of the underlying loans. 9 CMOs
are more complex mortgage-backed securities, comprised of pools of
home mortgages backed by government-insured agencies such as
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. 10 There are two streams of income from
each pool: one from the aggregate interest payments and the other from
the aggregate principal payments made on the mortgages. 11 These
income streams are then divided into tranches based on credit quality
and sold as separate securities to investors.12 Losses are applied in
reverse order of seniority and, therefore, junior tranches offer higher
coupons (interest rates) to compensate investors for the added default
risk. 13 Due to the risk associated with junior tranches, they have been
called “toxic waste” by some commentators. 14 Because CMOs are
backed by government-sponsored agencies, each tranche usually retains
a surprisingly high rating, although each has a completely different risk
profile. 15
CMO derivatives, such as “inverse floaters” 16 and “interest-only
strips,” 17 have become popular among investors in recent years. These
derivatives have considerably more risks than normal CMOs. One of
the risks associated with CMO derivatives is that their value fluctuates
significantly with slight changes in interest rates. 18 These products are
8. See SEC, Mortgage-Backed Securities, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgage
securities.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
9. Id.
10. See SEC, Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs), http://www.sec.gov/
answers/tcmos.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. For a detailed discussion of the conflicts between the various tranches, see
Michael Mackenzie, ‘Super-Senior’ CDO Investors Flex Their Muscles, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b2bcd0ee-0a5b-11ddb5b1-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1.
14. See Investopedia.com, Toxic Waste, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/
toxicwaste.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2008).
15. See John Churchill, The Death of a Brokerage, REGISTERED REP., Aug. 1, 2007,
available at http://www.registeredrep.com/advisorland/regulatory/finance_death_broker
age/index.html.
16. See Investopedia.com, Inverse Floater, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/
inversefloater.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2008).
17. See Investopedia.com, Interest Only (IO) Strips, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/i/iostrips.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2008).
18. Churchill, supra note 15 (“One of the risks associated with CMO derivatives
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also illiquid, meaning that investors are often stuck holding the securities even as their value spirals downward. 19 A related risk of CMO derivatives is pricing risk. Often CMO derivatives are priced only once a
month, using methodologies that may not be readily transparent. As a
result, when the time comes to sell the CMO derivatives, investors may
find it difficult to arrive at a price. 20
MBSs and CMOs gained tremendous popularity with investors in
the late 1990s and in the early part of this decade when broker-dealers
began recommending them to retail and institutional customers as suitable investment alternatives to treasury securities to hedge against inflation risk while earning a presumably safe return. In Banca Cremi, S.A.
v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., the Fourth Circuit summarized the turbulent
CMO market of the late-1980s to the mid-1990s: “From 1987 to 1993,
U.S. government-sponsored CMO issuances grew dramatically, from
$900 million to $311 billion per year. The market in CMOs collapsed in
1994; new issuances fell to $25.4 billion in 1995.”21
In the late 1990s, the country witnessed a resurgence in the mortgage-backed securities market as mortgage rates dropped and home
sales increased. 22 In 2000, the MBS market overtook the market for
U.S. treasury securities. 23 At its height, the total market value of all outstanding U.S. MBSs was approximately $6.1 trillion. 24 “[A]lmost $2
trillion [of that amount consisted of] riskier nonagency securities that are
not insured by the federal government or by Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac.” 25
When the subprime mortgage crisis hit the U.S. economy in late
2006, many investors holding MBSs or CMOs that were purchased
before 2006 suffered significant losses because the values of the underlike inverse floaters and interest-only strips . . . is that their value fluctuates wildly with
small moves in interest rates.”).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1022 (4th Cir.
1997).
22. See Richard W. Stevenson, The Outlook for Recovery: Three Factors to Watch,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, § 3, at 4.
23.
See Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n (SIFMA), U.S. Treasury Securities Outstanding, http://www.sifma.org/research/pdf/Treasury_Securities_Outstanding.pdf (last
visited Nov. 17, 2008).
24. See Edmund L. Andrews, Fed Hopes To Ease Strain on Economy Activity,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2008, at A1.
25. Id.
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lying assets sharply declined. These investors included retail customers,
corporations, and institutions such as pension funds, university endowments, municipalities, and even the investment banks themselves. The
fact that so many investment banks purchased MBSs and CMOs is a
significant difference from the crash in 1994. 26 As one commentator
described, “Wall Street drank its own Kool-Aid. Big investment banks
like Bear Stearns Cos., Citigroup and others not only sold the CDOs –
they also bought them.” 27
The losses have been enormous. As of May 2008, Citigroup had
suffered a staggering $40.7 billion in subprime losses – the most of any
bank – and had been forced to cut 9,000 jobs. 28 Other subprime losses
as of that date include: $38 billion at UBS, 29 $31.7 billion at Merrill
Lynch, 30 $14.9 billion at Bank of America, $12.6 billion at Morgan
Stanley, $12.4 billion at HSBC, $12 billion at Royal Bank of Scotland,
$9.7 billion at JP Morgan Chase, $8.3 billion at Washington Mutual,
$7.5 billion at Deutsche Bank, $7.3 billion at Wachovia, and $6.3 billion
at Credit Suisse. 31
Several financial services firms have been forced out of business
due to their dealings in MBSs and CMOs, leaving investors with significant losses. Most commentators blame the demise of Bear Stearns, Wall
Street’s fifth largest investment bank, on the subprime crisis. 32 Available credit virtually dried up as banks became less willing to lend to

26. See Christopher Thornberg, Wall Street Bailout?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2008,
available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-leonard-thornberg28mar28,0,
3127741, full story.
27. Id.
28. See BBC News, Timeline: Sub-prime Losses, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
business/7096845.stm (last visited Nov.17, 2008). All the figures reported in the text
include losses from all subprime instruments, not only MBSs and CMOs. Any
reference to “subprime” in the Article is not limited to MBSs and CMOs.
29. Id.
30. Id. In November 2007, Merrill Lynch experienced its largest write-down in
history of $8.4 billion, which at the time represented the biggest known loss in Wall
Street history. See Graham Bowley & Jenny Anderson, Where Did the Buck Stop at
Merrill?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, § 3.
31. Timeline: Sub-prime Losses, supra note 28.
32. See Koelle Boyce, Bear Stearns: Latest Victim of the Sub-prime Crisis,
BANKING BUS. REV., Mar. 17, 2008, http://www.banking-business-review.com/article_
feature.asp?guid=198FE768-A593-460B-AFFD-285301705565.
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each other after they suffered large losses on subprime mortgages and
related financial products. 33
Even smaller firms have suffered as a result of their activity in subprime mortgage products. Brookstreet Securities of Irvine, California,
one of the top 25 independent broker-dealer firms, went out of business
in June 2007 when a large number of institutional and retail customer
accounts received margin calls from Brookstreet’s clearing firm,
National Financial Services, a division of Fidelity Investments. 34 The
margin calls were sparked by a sudden decline in value of investments in
CMOs, including CMO derivatives. 35 By June 22, 2007, Brookstreet
had exhausted its entire net capital of $12 million to meet a margin call
and yet still had a margin balance of $70 million against securities worth
$85 million, and that value was declining. 36 Ultimately, Brookstreet
became insolvent. 37
As losses continue to stack up for investors of MBSs and CMOs, it
is inevitable that investors will seek legal recourse against the brokerdealers from which they purchased the securities. One claim that undoubtedly will be advanced by investors is that the MBSs and CMOs
were “unsuitable” investments. A broker-dealer has an obligation under
the governing rules of self-regulatory organizations (SROs), as well as
federal and state securities laws, to recommend only “suitable” investments and trading strategies. 38 A claim for unsuitability typically arises
when a representative of a broker-dealer recommends to a customer an
investment that he knows, or should have known, is inappropriate for
that customer based on the customer’s investment objectives. 39 An
allegation of unsuitability is among the most common claims brought in

33. See BBC News, Rescue for Troubled Wall Street Bank, Mar. 17, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7299938.stm.
34. Churchill, supra note 15.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See generally DAVID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
MANUAL § 5-5 (5th ed. 2008) (describing the legal obligations of a broker-dealer under
the various laws and rules).
39. See id. In the typical unsuitability claim, the customer alleges that the broker
recommended investments that were not appropriate for his investment goals, or even
his age and investment objectives. Unless otherwise indicated, this Article uses the
terms “customer,” “investor,” and “client” interchangeably to mean generally an
individual or institution that has a business relationship with a particular broker.
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securities arbitration. 40 In 1998, unsuitability claims accounted for 95%
of filings under the errors and omissions insurance policies of the
National Association of Securities Dealers (the NASD) members. 41
Unsuitability claims currently account for a large portion of the claims
asserted by customers during FINRA arbitration proceedings. 42
Mandatory arbitration clauses in the customer agreements at virtually every broker-dealer firm mean that claims asserted by investors will
be heard in arbitration unless both parties elect to have the case heard in
court. 43 Supreme Court precedent has made it nearly impossible for investors unilaterally to challenge a mandatory arbitration clause. 44
The shift in forum from courts to arbitration panels has had a significant effect on jurisprudence of unsuitability claims. In federal courts,
unsuitability claims are brought under the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws, primarily Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5, which together require a showing of intent to defraud or
recklessness. 45
By contrast, unsuitability claims in arbitration are brought under the
more amorphous rules of the self-regulatory organizations, which do not
necessarily require proof of fraud but instead are rooted in notions of

40. Id. In an Avoidance and Prevention Advisory (Advisory) distributed to its
member firms in May 1998, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(NASD) disclosed that unsuitability claims account for ninety-five percent of filings
under NASD members’ errors and omissions insurance policies. See Zarb Urges
Broker Dealers to ‘Be on Guard’ About Suitability, 30 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 810
(May 29, 1998).
41. See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities
Transactions, 54 BUS. LAW. 1557, 1557 (1999).
42. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, available at http://www.finra.org/Arbitration
Mediation/AboutFINRADR/Statistics/index.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). This Article
describes the existing doctrine of suitability and its application in certain circumstances,
rather than analyzing the justification of the doctrine of suitability. In other words, this
Article does not undertake a normative analysis of suitability.
43. See generally SIFMA, White Paper on Arbitration in the Securities Industry 3
(Oct. 2007), available at http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/pdf/arbitration-white-paper.
pdf [hereinafter White Paper on Arbitration]. An interesting issue to consider, which is
beyond the scope of this Article, is whether mandatory arbitration is an appropriate
scheme for the adjudication of disputes between a customer and broker.
44. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
45. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2008); Rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
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fairness and equity. 46 Although the vast majority of courts hold that
there is no private right of action for violations of SRO rules, 47 certain
rules, such as the FINRA suitability rules, set forth the standard of care
to which registered representatives and broker-dealers are judged in
arbitration. 48 A violation of FINRA rules may arise from intent, recklessness, or negligence. 49 To recover in arbitration, a customer asserting
a claim must prove, at a minimum, that the SRO rule (e.g., suitability)
sets forth the standard of care and that there was a breach of that standard of care that proximately caused damages.
This short Article explores the unsuitability claim from its inception
to its modern application. It then discusses unsuitability claims in the
context of MBSs and CMOs and in the forum of arbitration. Finally,
this Article briefly highlights some of the basic considerations of whether a safe harbor for recommendations of brokers to certain institutional
customers would be appropriate to consider.

46. See White Paper on Arbitration, supra note 43. There are some instances
where an action in court based on fraud and a claim in arbitration based on fairness and
equity will reach the same result, although the starting positions may be different.
47. See, e.g., Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 200 (3d
Cir. 1990) (“NASD regulations do not give rise to a private right of action.”); Salzmann
v. Prudential Securities Inc., No. 91 Civ. 4253 (KTD), 1994 WL 191855, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1994) (agreeing with “the large body of case law holding that no
private cause of action exists for violation of the rules of self-regulatory organizations”
(quoting Bloch v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 707 F. Supp. 189, 195-96 (W.D. Pa.1989)).
48. See NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, NASD MANUAL, RULES OF THE
ASSOCIATION, Rule 2310, http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?
rbid=2403&element_id=3638&record_id=4315 (last visited Oct. 12, 2008) [hereinafter
FINRA Conduct Rule 2310]. As of the date of publication of this Article, FINRA has
been in the process of transferring rules from the NASD rulebook to the Consolidated
FINRA Rulebook. See FINRA’s Rulebook Consolidation Process, available at
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/FINRARules/P038095. Although technically
it currently is “NASD” Conduct Rule 2310, this Article refers to all of the rules as
“FINRA” in anticipation of the transfer to the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook. It also
should be noted that some of the rules may be re-numbered following the transfer. See
Rulebook Consolidation Process, available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry
/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p117155.pdf.
49. Id.
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF UNSUITABILITY CLAIMS
A. The Requirement To Recommend Only Suitable Investments
The notion that financial services professionals are required to recommend only suitable investments to customers has existed since the beginning of the securities laws in the United States. 50 Shortly after its
establishment in 1938, the NASD, the SRO then responsible for the
regulation of the broker-dealers, adopted Article III, section 2 of its
Rules of Fair Practice, 51 which mandated that members recommend only
suitable investments. 52 The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 53 the
American Stock Exchange, 54 and several regional exchanges followed
with their own rules pertaining to the suitability of investments.
Beginning in July 2007, the NASD was phased out with the
creation of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).55
50. See generally JOHN RAYMOND BOATRIGHT, ETHICS IN FINANCE 15-17 (1999);
Financial Product Fundamentals, § 10:2.2, at 10-6 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 1999)
(explaining how an adviser recommended speculative equipment leasing partnerships to
unsophisticated investors with modest incomes (citing Westmark Fin. Servs. Corp.,
Investment Advisors Act Rel. No. 1117 (May 16, 1998))).
51. This rule since has been renamed Conduct Rule 2310. See Self-Regulatory
Organizations: Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. Regarding Rearranging of Rules and a New Rule Numbering
System for The NASD Manual, File No. SR-NASD-95-51, Exchange Act Release No.
34-36698 (Jan. 11, 1996).
52. The rule sets out principles for fair dealing with customers and the broad parameters for suitability of securities transactions:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a
member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is
suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such
customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.

FINRA Conduct Rule 2310(a), supra note 48.
53. NYSE Rule 405, first enacted in 1969, currently states as follows: “use due
diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer and every cash or margin
account, including accounts in Non-Managed Fee-Based Account programs, accepted
or carried by such member organization.” NYSE Rule 405(6), N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) P
2405, at 3696 (2001) available at http://rules.nyse.com/nysetools/Exchangeviewer.asp
?SelectedNode=chp_1_3&manual =/nyse/nyse_rules/nyse-rules/.
54. American Stock Exchange Guide (CCH) P 9431, 2647 (1995).
55. FINRA was created in July 2007 through the consolidation of NASD and the
member regulation, enforcement and arbitration functions of the NYSE. FINRA “is the
largest non-governmental regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United
States.” FINRA.org, About FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/CorporateInfor
mation/index.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2009).
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Although the NASD suitability rule had undergone several amendments
over the years, the rule currently exists as FINRA Conduct Rule 2310. 56
Because FINRA “oversees nearly 5,000 brokerage firms, about 173,000
branch offices and approximately 677,000 registered securities representatives,” 57 FINRA Conduct Rule 2310 is the most often-cited rule in
disputes concerning suitability. Rule 2310 does not require a showing of
intent, or even recklessness, on the part of the financial services representative. Instead, the rule relies upon quasi-equitable principles of due
care and fair dealing. 58 In its current form, FINRA Conduct Rule 2310
provides:
(a) In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of
any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing
that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis
of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other
59
security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.

For non-institutional investors, FINRA members (e.g., brokers)
must make “reasonable efforts” to obtain information concerning such
areas as the customer’s financial status, tax status, investment objectives,
and any other information considered in making a recommendation. 60
By its terms, FINRA Conduct Rule 2310 is limited to recommendations. 61 While the meaning of the term “recommendation” has been the
subject of much debate, it generally means “when the [FINRA] member
or its associated person brings a specific security to the attention of the
customer through any means, including, but not limited to, direct telephone communication, the delivery of promotional material through the
mail, or the transmission of electronic messages.” 62 On the other hand,
56.
57.
58.

See FINRA Conduct Rule 2310(a), supra note 48.
Id.
See, e.g., Nelson v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. CV203-131, 2004 WL
1592617, at *3 (S.D. Ga. July 12, 2004) (“Implicit in all member and registered representative relationships with customers and others is the fundamental responsibility for
fair dealing.” (quoting FINRA Conduct Rule 2310) (internal quotations omitted)).
59. FINRA Conduct Rule 2310(a), supra note 48.
60. FINRA Conduct Rule 2310(b), supra note 48.
61. FINRA Rule 2310(a), supra note 48; see also Parsons v. Hornblower & WeeksHemphill Noyes, 447 F. Supp. 482, 495 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (explaining that Rule 2310(a)
requires an evaluation of suitability only with respect to recommendations); George A.
Schieren et al., Suitability and Institutions, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1995, at 699, 75261 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7112 1995).
62. NASD, Notice to Members 96-60, Clarification of Members’ Suitability

2009

SUITABLE FOR UNSUITABILITY CLAIMS?

261

FINRA Conduct Rule 2310 “would not apply . . . to situations in which
a member acts solely as an order-taker for persons who, on their own
initiative, effect transactions without a recommendation from the
member.” 63 Still, as far back as 1997, the NASD clarified: “[w]hether a
particular transaction is in fact recommended depends on an analysis of
all the relevant facts and circumstances . . . .” 64
Lawyers, academics, and commentators have struggled to determine when the delivery of promotional materials would constitute a
“recommendation”. Today, this debate is particularly important in the
context of complex financial products such as MBSs and CMOs because
clients periodically receive reports on these products from brokers. A
suitability claim may turn on whether a client received an unsolicited
report from a broker concerning the product or whether the client requested the material.
Several provisions of “Interpretative Material” by FINRA help to
define the scope of the suitability rule. Interpretative Material is generally considered to be part of the rules it interprets and has the same importance as the actual rules. 65 Three provisions of Interpretative Material

Responsibilities Under NASD Rules With Special Emphasis On Member Activities In
Speculative And Low-Priced Securities (Sep. 1996), available at http://www.finra.org/
web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p016905.pdf.
63. Id. (citing Sales Practice Requirements for Certain Low Priced Securities,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-27160, 54 Fed. Reg. 35468 (Aug. 28, 1989)). In Release
No. 34-27160, the SEC explained the term “recommendation” in the context of the new
penny stock rules. The Commission explained: “[T]he NASD and other suitability
rules have long applied only to “recommended” transactions. . . . [T]he [Penny Stock
Suitability] Rule would not apply to situations in which a broker-dealer functioned
solely as an order taker and executed transactions for person who on their own initiative
decided to purchase a [penny stock] without a recommendation from the broker-dealer.
Nor would the Rule apply to general advertisements not involving a direct recommendation to the individual. The Rule would apply, however, to situations where the
broker-dealer recommends to an investor the purchase of a specific [penny stock],
whether through direct telephone communication with the customer or through sending
promotional material through the mail.” Sales Practice Requirements for Certain LowPriced Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27160, 54 Fed. Reg. 35468, 35476-77
(Aug. 28, 1989), 1989 SEC LEXIS 1603, at 52 (Aug. 22, 1989).
64. NASD, For Your Information, Clarification of Notice to Members 96-90 (Mar.
1997), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/Industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/docu
ments/Notices/P004933.pdf.
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(27) (2006). But see NASD, Notice to Members 9625, SEC Approves NASD Manual Revisions, Publication Scheduled for May, NTM 9625 (Apr. 1996), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/
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are particularly relevant to the suitability doctrine in general, and specifically as applied to complex financial products: (i) IM-2310-1, “Possible Application of SEC Rules 15g-1 through 15g-9”; 66 (ii) IM-2310-2,
“Fair Dealing with Customers”; 67 and (iii) IM-2310-3, “Suitability
Obligations to Institutional Customers.” 68
IM-2310-1 provides that non-exchange-listed equity trading for less
than $5 per share may be subject to the SEC’s penny-stock rules 15g-1
through 15g-9. 69 In essence, these SEC penny-stock rules provide for
enhanced disclosures and a two-day “cooling off period” during which
the broker must furnish the investor with a disclosure document that
must be signed and returned by the investor. 70
IM-2310-2 interjects the equitable concept of “fair dealing” into the
suitability doctrine. It states that “sales efforts must be judged on the
basis of whether they can be reasonably said to represent fair treatment
for the persons to whom the sales efforts are directed, rather than on the
argument that they result in profits to customers”. 71 IM-2310-2 sets
forth a non-exhaustive list of examples where fair dealing was not observed. 72 It also contains a provision addressing “new financial products,” which may have a bearing on certain MBSs and CMOs. That
subsection states in part:

@notice/documents/notices/p005008.pdf (“IM stands for Interpretive Material of the
Rules of the Associate that has not been converted to Rule form, including interpretations, resolutions, explanations, policies and guidelines. The IM number includes
the number of the Rule or Rules Series which the material interprets.” (emphasis
added)).
66. NASD, Possible Application of SEC Rules 15g-1 through 15g-9, NASD
Manual (CCH), IM-2310-1, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display
.html?rbid=2403&record_id=4316&element_id=3639&highlight=Possible+Application
+of+SEC+Rules+15g-1#r4316 [hereinafter IM-2310-1].
67. NASD, Rules of Fair Practice, NASD Manual (CCH), IM-2310-2, available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=4317&eleme
nt_id=3640&highlight=IM-2310-2#r4317 [hereinafter IM-2310-2].
68. NASD, Considerations Regarding the Scope of Members’ Obligations to
Institutional Customers, NASD Manual (CCH), IM-2310-3, available at http://finra.
complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3641
[hereinafter IM-2310-3]. As of the date of publication of this Article, FINRA has been
in the process of renumbering these provisions. See supra note 48.
69. IM-2310-1, supra note 66.
70. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-1-9 (2008).
71. IM-2310-2, supra note 67.
72. Id.
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As new products are introduced from time to time, it is important
that members make every effort to familiarize themselves with each
customer’s financial situation, trading experience, and ability to meet
the risks involved with such products and to make every effort to
make customers aware of the pertinent information regarding the
73
products.

B. Suitability Obligations Owed to Institutional Investors
A separate provision of Interpretive Material, IM-2310-3, explains
the suitability obligations owed to “institutional investors”, particularly
those “with at least $10 million invested in securities in the aggregate in
its portfolio and/or under management”. 74 It addresses both debt and
equity securities. 75 Although IM-2310-3, by its title, is directed towards
institutional clients, it reiterates the general, two-part test for suitability.
That is, the broker must have (1) a reasonable basis for recommending a
particular security or strategy to an institutional client, and (2) reasonable grounds for believing the recommendation is suitable for the customer to whom it is made. 76 In other words, a recommendation must be
suitable for at least some institutional customer (an objective test) and
suitable for the specific customer (a subjective test). IM-2310-3 concedes that “[t]he manner in which a member fulfills this suitability obligation will vary depending on the nature of the customer and the specific
transaction,” 77 and it provides a non-exhaustive list of the factors that
should be considered by the broker in making a recommendation.
Regarding this list, the provision states that:

73. See id. at (e). FINRA reiterated these requirements in September 2007 in
Regulatory Notice 07-43, which stated: “Firms do not have an obligation to shield their
customers from risks that customers want to take, but they are required to fully
understand the products recommended by their registered representatives, to give their
customers a fair and balanced picture of the risks, costs and benefits associated with the
products or transactions they recommend and recommend only those products that are
suitable in light of the customer’s financial goals and needs.” FINRA, Regulatory
Notice, Senior Investors 07-43 (Sept. 2007), at 3, available at http://www.finra.org/web
/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p036816.pdf.
74. IM-2310-3, supra note 68. Institutional investors may include corporations,
trusts, investment banks, municipalities, pension funds, hedge funds, mutual funds, and
other registered entities. See FINRA Rule 3110(c).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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[t]he two most important considerations in determining the scope of
a member’s suitability obligations in making recommendations to an
institutional customer are the customer’s capability to evaluate investment risk independently and the extent to which the customer is
exercising independent judgment in evaluating a member’s recom78
mendation.

IM-2310-3 also attempts to explain the point at which the brokerdealer has satisfied its obligation with respect to suitability for a sophisticated institutional investor. “Where the broker-dealer has reasonable
grounds for concluding that the institutional customer is making independent investment decisions and is capable of independently evaluating
investment risk, then a member’s obligation to determine that a recommendation is suitable for a particular customer is fulfilled.” 79 A footnote
following that statement warns, however: “This interpretation does not
address the obligation related to suitability that requires that a member
have ‘. . . a reasonable basis to believe that the recommendation could be
suitable for at least some customers’”. 80
It is unclear whether this footnote has any independent significance.
A broker that has reasonable grounds for concluding that the institutional customer has the requisite capability to evaluate the risks arguably
would meet the duty of having a reasonable basis for believing that the
investment is suitable for at least one customer. In other words, the fact
that an institutional investor with the requisite capability to evaluate the
risk is purchasing the investment provides a reasonable basis for the
broker to believe that the investment could be suitable for at least some
customers.
C. Special Considerations of Suitability Regarding MBSs and CMOs
With the rise in mortgage-backed securities at the turn of the
twenty-first century, the NASD in November 2003 adopted IM-2210-8,
“Communications with the Public about Collateralized Mortgage
Obligations (CMOs)”. 81 IM-2210-8 sets forth the types of disclosures
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id. n.2.
NASD, Communications with the Public About Collateralized Mortgage
Obligations (CMOs), NASD Manual (CCH) IM-2210-8, available at http://finra.compli
net.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=4301&element_id=3625&highl
ight=im-2210-8#r4301 [hereinafter IM-2210-8].
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that must be provided to investors. The level of disclosures required
differs depending on whether the customer is an institutional investor or
non-institutional investor. All advertisements, sales literature, and correspondence provided to any investor concerning CMOs must include,
among other disclosures, that the instrument is a “Collateralized
Mortgage Obligation” 82 and that “a CMO’s yield and average life will
fluctuate depending on the actual rate at which mortgage holders prepay
the mortgages underlying the CMO and changes in current interest
rates”. 83 Comparisons with other investment vehicles, including a bank
certificate of deposit, are permitted but not required. 84 IM 2310-8 also
requires a broker to provide customers with “questions an investor
should ask before investing”, but it does not provide any guidance on
what those questions should be. 85
For non-institutional investors, a broker must offer educational
materials that include:
[C]haracteristics and risks of CMOs including credit quality,
prepayment rates and average lives, interest rates (including their
effect on value and prepayment rates), tax considerations, minimum
86
investments, transaction costs and liquidity;
[T]he structure of a CMO, including the various types of tranches
that may be issued and the rights and risks pertaining to each (including the fact that two CMOs with the same underlying collateral
may be prepaid at different rates and may have different price
87
volatility); and
[T]he relationship between mortgage loans and mortgage securi88
ties.

D. Suitability Claims in the Courts
Unlike the suitability doctrine that has developed under the rules of
the NASD and later FINRA, the suitability doctrine under the case law
is based on rigid legal principals relating to fraud rather than equity and
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. § (b)(1)(A).
Id. § (b)(1)(D).
Id. § (b)(1)(B).
Id. § (b)(2)(B).
Id. § (b)(2)(A)(i).
Id. § (b)(2)(A)(ii).
Id. § (b)(2)(A)(iii).
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fairness. Specifically, the suitability doctrine in case law is rooted primarily in the antifraud provisions of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. 89 The basic elements of an unsuitability
claim are:
1. that the securities purchased were unsuited to the buyer’s
needs;
2. that the defendant knew or reasonably believed the securities
were unsuited to the buyer’s needs;
3. that the defendant recommended or purchased the unsuitable
securities for the buyer anyway;
4. that, with scienter, the defendant made material misrepresentations (or, owing a duty to the buyer, failed to disclose material
information) relating to the suitability of the securities; and
5. that the buyer justifiably relied to its detriment on the defendant’s fraudulent conduct. 90
Unlike an unsuitability claim brought under the rules of FINRA, an
unsuitability claim under Section 10(b) requires the plaintiff-investor to
establish that there was a material misstatement or omission by the broker and that the plaintiff-investor relied upon that statement or omission. 91 The level of an investor’s sophistication is the primary factor
that courts weigh to determine whether the investor’s reliance on
representations by a broker was justified. 92

89. Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993)
(explaining that a claim for unsuitability “is a subset of the ordinary §10(b) fraud
claim”); see also O’Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1992)
(The court explained that a suitability claim could be analyzed “simply as a misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact. In such a case, the broker has omitted
telling the investor the recommendation is unsuitable for the investor’s interests. The
court may then use traditional laws concerning omission to examine the claim.”).
90. Brown, 991 F.2d at 1031 (setting forth the elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim
based on unsuitability).
91. Robert N. Clemens Trust v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 485 F.3d 840, 846 (6th
Cir. 2007) (“A valid claim under Section 10(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-5 ‘must allege,
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, the misstatement or omission of a
material fact, made with scienter, upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied and which
proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.’”) (quoting In re Comshare Inc., 183 F.3d
542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999)).
92. See, e.g., Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 642 F. Supp. 1277, 1299 (W.D. Mich.
1986) (holding that the sophistication of the customer is dispositive).

2009

SUITABLE FOR UNSUITABILITY CLAIMS?

267

Historically, courts have been reluctant to hold that sophisticated
investors relied on recommendations made by their brokers. 93 For
example, in Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., the Fourth
Circuit held that a brokerage firm, Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., did not
fraudulently sell unsuitable investments when it sold CMOs to Banca
Cremi, S.A., a Mexican bank, because Banca Cremi was a sophisticated
investor with knowledge of the risks. 94 When the market in CMOs
collapsed in 1994, Banca Cremi suffered substantial losses on six CMOs
it had purchased through Alex. Brown. The Fourth Circuit found that
Banca Cremi had chosen its own investment strategy by balancing the
risks and benefits of the CMOs against its goals. 95 The court concluded
that Banca Cremi had sufficient sophistication and had been provided
with adequate information to appreciate the risks of CMOs “to render
unjustified any reliance on a recommendation that the securities were
suitable investments”. 96

93. See, e.g., Banca Cremi, 132 F.3d 1017; Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d
798, 804-06 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that investors, who were wealthy and sophisticated
attorneys, were not justified in relying on misrepresentation of broker’s employee
concerning limited partnership units); Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d
673, 677-78 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that an investor, who had a college degree in
economics, had taken a course in accounting, had read corporate financial reports with
understanding, and who was a regular reader of investment advisory literature failed to
assert a claim for unsuitability); Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 763 (2d Cir. 1977)
(“The securities laws were not enacted to protect sophisticated businessmen from their
own errors of judgment. Such investors must, if they wish to recover under federal law,
investigate the information available to them with the care and prudence expected from
people blessed with full access to information.”).
94. Banca Cremi, 132 F.3d at 1032.
95. Id. at 1029.
96. Id. at 1032; see also supra note 93.
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III. ARBITRATION OF UNSUITABILITY CLAIMS OF MORTGAGE-BACKED
SECURITIES AND COLLATERALIZED MORTGAGE OBLIGATIONS
As a result of mandatory arbitration clauses in most customer
agreements, arbitration tribunals have become the principal forum for
private actions for damages based on violation of the suitability doctrine.
Arbitrators have greater flexibility than federal judges in fashioning an
outcome based on principles of fairness and equity. 97 Indeed, The
Arbitrator’s Manual states:
Equity is justice in that it goes beyond the written law. And it is
equitable to prefer arbitration to the law court, for the arbitrator
keeps equity in view, whereas the judge looks only to the law, and
the reason why arbitrators were appointed was that equity might
98
prevail.

A review of arbitration decisions illustrates the flexible standards
that arbitrators apply to reach a result. For example, in Peterzell v.
Charles Schwab & Co., a retail customer brought a claim against his
broker for damages, alleging that the broker induced him to purchase options that were unsuitable for his investment objectives. 99 The
brokerage firm argued that the broker never asserted that he was an
expert in options trades, that the customer indicated that he was
experienced in options trades, and that the broker provided the customer
with an accurate prospectus. 100 The arbitration panel nevertheless
awarded the customer a portion of his claim. 101 The panel explained:
Claimant, Joel Peterzell, contributed to his losses by providing false
information, devising a questionable strategy and continuing to trade

97. See Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial
Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 120 (1997) (“Unlike judges who
are bound by rigid legal principles, arbitrators tend to be flexible, considering business
ethics, the relation of the parties and other nonlegal factors in reaching innovative
decisions.” (internal citations omitted)).
98. Sec. Indust. Conf. On Arbitration, The Arbitrator’s Manual, Preface (2007),
available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/@neutrl/
documents/arbmed/p009668.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2008) (quoting Domke on
Aristotle).
99. Peterzell v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., No. 88-02868, 1991 WL 202358
(N.A.S.D. June 17, 1991).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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as losses mounted. Suitability, however, is an ongoing obligation
and, although Charles Schwab initially met its suitability obligations,
it failed to maintain any ongoing supervision of the Claimant’s
suitability.
At some point in time, Claimant became unsuitable, even with his
false representations. Charles Schwab’s Compliance Department
should have, at that time, realized his losses were disproportionate to
102
his claimed net worth and annual income.

In other words, arbitration panels have awarded damages to customers even where the same claims may not have survived a motion to
dismiss in federal court. 103 That is because absolute defenses in law are
generally viewed by arbitrators as merely mitigating factors to weigh in
determining the overall fairness of the result. 104 The statistics seem to
prove this point: 20% of all arbitration claims are ultimately decided by
arbitrators, while only about 1.5% of civil claims filed in court are
decided by a judge or jury. 105
Moreover, judicial review of arbitration awards is severely limited.
Arbitration decisions are rarely published, so arbitrators can fashion
equitable remedies without facing public scrutiny. In addition, under the
Federal Arbitration Act, a court generally may not vacate an arbitration
award because the arbitrator made erroneous findings of fact or misapplied the law. 106 Instead, the appellant must establish, inter alia, that
the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law, which is nearly
impossible to show, particularly when the decision of the arbitration
panel is not published. 107
102.
103.

Id.
See White Paper on Arbitration, supra note 43, at 26 (“Whereas motion practice is standard in courts, SRO arbitration generally discourages dispositive motions.”).
104. See id. at 26-28.
105. Id. at 3.
106. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2008); see also Miller v. Prudential Bach Securities, Inc., 884
F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[S]uch misinterpretation or misapplication simply does
not constitute grounds for vacating an arbitrator’s decision.”).
107. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Intern. Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 91-92
(2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the arbitral panel did not manifestly disregard the law;
“‘The manifest disregard’ doctrine allows a reviewing court to vacate an arbitral award
only in those exceedingly rare instances where some egregious impropriety on the part
of the arbitrators is apparent” (quotation omitted)); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Hale, 19
Misc.3d 975, 985, 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 28141, 9 (N.Y. Sup. Mar 31, 2008) (holding that
arbitrator’s ruling satisfies the threshold “barely colorable” interpretive standard of
review for manifest disregard of law to be applied under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)). But see
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A. Claims Brought by Retail Customers
With these concepts in mind, customers who have suffered losses
from MBSs and CMOs likely will assert unsuitability claims that are
focused on the general unfairness associated with their losses. Investors
who purchased low tranche CMOs (which had the greatest risk) and
CMO derivatives based on the advice of their brokers have suffered the
largest losses. Some have argued that the low tranches and CMO derivatives are per se unsuitable for retail customers given the tremendous
risk associated. 108 This is not the first time such an argument has been
advanced. When the CMO market crashed in 1994, commentators questioned whether low tranche CMOs and CMO derivatives were appropriate for retail customers, and successful legal actions were brought
under the premise that they were not. 109 This argument, however, fails
to account for the fact that some retail investors are sophisticated and
may have a preference for high-risk investments.
In the recent subprime mortgage crisis, some initial signs indicate
that brokers may have pushed retail customers into these risky products.
In a June 2007 “ComplianceAlert”, 110 the Office of Compliance
Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) 111 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission identified a number of deficiencies in the sales practices at
some broker-dealers that sold CMOs to retail customers. OCIE obHalligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the
arbitrators acted with manifest disregard for the law).
108. See Churchill, supra note 15.
109. Susan Antilla, Wall Street; Salomon’s Hong Kong Hangover, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
18, 1994, at F13; see also Ted Sickinger, Broker Hit with Big Fine: Piper Jaffray Cited
for Improper Marketing of High-Risk Derivatives, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 7, 1996, at B1
(describing how NASD disciplined Piper Jaffray for improperly marketing and selling a
mutual fund that contained high-risk, mortgage-backed derivatives); Merrill Lynch Is
Told To Pay Two Clients, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1996, at 45 (describing how NASD
arbitration panel awarded $1 million to elderly sisters after Merrill Lynch sold to them
CMOs on margin).
110. SEC, ComplianceAlert (June 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/
offices/ocie/complialert.htm [hereinafter ComplianceAlert].
111. “The Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) protects
investors through administering the SEC’s nationwide examination and inspection program. Examiners in Washington D.C. and in the Commission’s 11 regional offices
conduct examinations of the nation’s registered entities, including self-regulatory
organizations, broker-dealers, transfer agents, investment companies and investment
advisers.” SEC, OCIE http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie.shtml (last visited Nov. 7,
2008).
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served that the broker-dealers it had examined “had sold some of the
most complex and riskiest classes of [CMO] securities to their retail
customers”. 112 If a broker recommended these higher-risk products and
the retail customer suffered a loss, arbitrators might feel compelled
under equitable principles to award damages without fully evaluating
whether the customer appreciated the risks. 113 On the flip side, the suitability evaluation creates the potential for gamesmanship as retail investors might argue in hindsight that they lacked the requisite sophistication
to appreciate the risks of the investment.
The disclosures provided by some brokers to investors may have
been insufficient. In its 2007 examination, OCIE stated that “[i]n some
cases, the firms did not provide investors with NASD-required
educational materials” 114 , which are required by IM-2210-8. 115 “At
other times, firms presented investors with sales literature that appeared
to be unbalanced and misleading in the way that it portrayed the risks
and yields of the securities, and that generally minimized the risks of the
securities.” 116 OCIE also observed that some firms either failed to submit the advertisements and sales literature concerning CMOs to the
NASD for approval, or did not “respond adequately to NASD’s comments prior to using sales material. These firms disseminated information which did not appear to provide balanced and complete disclosure
of the risks inherent in the CMOs that were sold”. 117 Undoubtedly, both
retail and institutional investors that lost money on MBSs and CMOs as
a result of a broker’s failure to provide proper literature will highlight
that failure in their arbitration complaints.
Further compounding customer harm, some brokers recommended
112.
113.

ComplianceAlert, supra note 110.
See Michael Hudson & Justin Lahart, Suits Fly over Mortgage Risks to
Investors, CHI. TRIB., Jul. 22, 2007, at 41. Awarding recovery to a retail customer, who
knowingly assumed the risks of the investment, potentially creates a moral hazard. If
recovery is possible under the suitability doctrine irrespective of the investor’s sophistication, then the investor would have less incentive to undertake his own independent
analysis of the risks.
114. ComplianceAlert, supra note 110.
115. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
116. ComplianceAlert, supra note 110.
117. See id. In September 2008, FINRA brought an enforcement action against
three brokers who engaged in abuses in their marketing and sales of mortgage-backed
securities to retail customers. See FINRA Sanctions Three Brokers for Sales of CMOs
to Retail Investors, available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2008
/P039153 (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
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that retail customers invest in MBSs and CMOs on margin. 118 Investing
on margin is essentially borrowing money from a broker to purchase
securities. 119 A broker’s recommendation to purchase on margin may be
considered unsuitable, even aside from the underlying investment, if the
customer, such as an elderly or retired customer, cannot absorb losses or
has a low risk tolerance. 120 Some securities are simply not appropriate
for margin accounts due to the risks involved. For instance, brokers
generally do not permit customers to purchase penny stocks, over-thecounter bulletin board securities or initial public offerings on margin.121
Given the risks associated with certain MBSs and CMOs (particularly
CMO derivatives), allowing certain customers to purchase these instruments on margin may be viewed as presumptive evidence of unsuitability.
B. Claims Bought by Institutional Investors
For institutional investors, the outcome of an unsuitability claim in
arbitration may turn, as a practical matter, less on fairness and more on
whether the institutional investor was able to appreciate and comprehend
the risks. 122 Of course, if the broker provided false or misleading disclosures to an institutional customer, then the arbitrator may not reach
the question of the customer’s sophistication except to ascertain whether
the customer knew the information was false or misleading. 123 If, on the
118. See, e.g., Sonn & Erez, More About Misconduct, http://www.sonnerez.com/
PracticeAreas/More-About-Misconduct.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
119.
Investopedia.com, Margin Trading: What Is Buying on Margin?,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/margin/margin1.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2008).
120. See Merrill Lynch Is Told To Pay Two Clients, supra note 109 (describing how
NASD arbitration panel awarded $1 million to two elderly sisters after Merrill Lynch
sold them CMOs on margin).
121. Margin Trading: What Is Buying on Margin?, supra note 119.
122. See, e.g., Banca Cremi, 132 F.3d at 1029 (rejecting plaintiff bank’s argument
that it was not a sophisticated investor based on records reflecting that it did not blindly
follow broker’s advice); Kennedy 814 F.2d at 804-06 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that
investors, who were wealthy and sophisticated attorneys, were not justified in relying
on misrepresentation of broker’s employee concerning limited partnership units);
Follansbee, 681 F.2d at 677-78 (holding that an investor, who had a college degree in
economics, who had taken a course in accounting, who had read corporate financial
reports with understanding, and who was a regular reader of investment advisory
literature failed to assert a claim for unsuitability); Hirsh, 553 F.2d 3 at 763.
123. Cf. Banca Cremi, 132 F.3d at 1029 (holding that bank’s reliance on broker’s
false misrepresentation was not justified because knowledge can be imputed when
investor’s conduct amounts to recklessness).

2009

SUITABLE FOR UNSUITABILITY CLAIMS?

273

other hand, the broker provided complete and accurate disclosures to the
institutional customer as required under IM-2210-8, the outcome of the
arbitration likely will depend on the level of sophistication of the institutional customer. 124 The arbitration proceeding therefore will focus on
the level of review conducted by the institutional customer, as well as
the sophistication of the persons at the institution who conducted the
review.
Certain MBSs and CMOs may be so complex that some institutional investors cannot appreciate the risk. FINRA explained this concern in a Regulatory Notice in September 2007:
FINRA is concerned about the suitability of recommendations to
some pension plans, particularly recommendations involving relatively new, complicated or high-risk asset classes such as . . . the
equity tranches of some collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs).
As NASD IM-2310-3 points out, even institutional investors that
have the general capability to assess risk may not be able to understand a particular instrument, particularly a product that is new or
that has significantly different risk and volatility characteristics than
other investments made by the institution. Therefore, in making
recommendations to institutional customers, including pension
funds, firms should consider both the general ability of the institution
to independently assess investment risk, and whether the customer
understands the particular product well enough to exercise that
125
ability with respect to the recommendation.

The difficulty lies in the fact that all institutional investors are not
equivalent. FINRA defines “institutional customer” in general terms as
“any entity other than a natural person”. 126 Some institutional investors
– such as commercial banks, large municipalities, and public companies
– usually employ persons with financial expertise to oversee the investments of the institution. The size of the institution generally affects its
financial ability to hire investment officers with the requisite knowledge
and skills to understand complex financial products. 127
Even with the expertise of investment officers, however, some
institutional investors have lost substantial amounts of money as a result
124. Cf. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1279 (S.D.
Ohio 1996).
125. FINRA, Regulatory Notice, Senior Investors, supra note 73, at 4.
126. IM-2310-3, supra note 68.
127. See Norman S. Poser, Liability of Broker-Dealers for Unsuitable
Recommendations to Institutional Investors, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1493, 1505 (2001).
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of brokers recommending unsuitable investments. 128 For example, in
the 1990s, the large conglomerate Proctor & Gamble brought an unsuitability claim after suffering substantial losses on unsuitable investments
recommended by its broker. 129 Similarly, one academic institution in the
mid-1990s, City Colleges of Chicago, lost $50 million, which comprised
half of its portfolio, as a result of its investments in CMOs. 130 Orange
County, California, with $7.4 billion in assets, has been one of the
largest institutions to bring an unsuitability claim against a broker. 131
Obviously, an institutional investor, which is not a natural person,
cannot be “sophisticated” or “unsophisticated”; rather, the level of the
institution’s sophistication depends entirely on the individual or individuals tasked with evaluating the investment decision. Even some institutional investors benefit from the added input of a broker. As one municipal official testified in the aftermath of the 1994 CMO crash:
Regardless of the size of their portfolio or their level of
sophistication, state and local government investors are unlikely to
have access to either the quantity or quality of information relating to
specific investment instruments that a broker-dealer has. Broker
dealers have real-time, virtually unlimited access to information,
132
such as pricing, structure, and risk factors of an instrument.

Another focus in any arbitration involving an institutional customer
will be on the stated investment objectives of the institution, which may
128. See, e.g., State v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 459 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1995)
(unsuitability claims on behalf of the state of West Virginia); City of San Jose v. Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. C 84-20601 RFP, 1991 WL 352485 (N.D. Cal.
June 6, 1991) (unsuitability claim on behalf of City of San Jose, California); Pension
Fund-Mid Jersey Trucking Indus.–Local 701 v. Omni Funding Group, 731 F. Supp. 161
(D.N.J. 1990) (unsuitability claim on behalf of pension fund); MidAmerica Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 886 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1989)
(unsuitability claim on behalf of savings and loan institution); Associated Randall Bank
v. Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, Inc., 3 F.3d 208 (7th Cir. 1993) (unsuitability
claim on behalf of a bank).
129. Proctor & Gamble, 925 F. Supp. 1270.
130. Westcap Enters. v. City Colleges of Chicago, 230 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2000).
131. County of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re County of Orange), 191 B.R.
1005, 1017 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996); Andrew Pollack & Leslie Wayne, Ending Suit,
Merrill Lynch to Pay California County $400 million, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1998, at
A1.
132. Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the
H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Mark J. Saladino, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles County, California).
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be reflected in the municipality’s governing law or in the institution’s
articles of organization, charter, or bylaws. If a broker recommended an
investment that conflicts with the stated investment objectives of the
institution, then the institution may be able to recover on an unsuitability
claim even where the institution’s investment officers fully comprehended the risks. 133
IV. CONSIDERATION OF A NEW APPROACH FOR INSTITUTIONAL AND
SOPHISTICATED INVESTORS
The anticipated influx of unsuitability claims relating to MBSs and
CDOs may spark calls for new regulatory guidance in the area of institutional investors. Such guidance may be long overdue. The number of
institutional investors and their influence has increased significantly in
the second half of the last century. In 1950, only seven percent of the
total outstanding corporate stock was owned by institutional investors.134
By 2000, fifty-one percent of all stock was owned by institutional
investors. 135
Any regulatory response should consider the potential moral hazard
created by the existing suitability rules for institutional customers. By
having the recourse of an unsuitability claim, institutional investors are
insulated from some investment risk, which may result in that investor
undertaking less due diligence than if it had borne more risk. As discussed above, IM-2310-3 attempts to address this concern regarding the
moral hazard with respect to sophisticated institutional investors by
stating that a broker’s obligations are discharged after determining that
the institutional customer has made an “independent investment
decision[]” and is “capable of independently evaluating investment
risk.” 136
Unfortunately, IM-2310-3 provides little certainty to investors or
broker-dealers. The scheme under IM-2310-3 is open to manipulation
by some investors who might claim post hoc in arbitration that they
lacked the ability to appreciate the risk at the time of their investment
decision. On the other hand, the scheme also allows for brokers to argue
that their institutional customers appreciated the risk and made an inde-

133.
134.
135.
136.

FINRA, Regulatory Notice, Senior Investors, supra note 73, at 4.
Poser, supra note 127, at 1501.
Id.
IM-2310-3, supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.

276

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XIV

pendent investment decision. Coupled with the uncertainty associated
with IM-2310-3 is the inherent uncertainty of arbitration proceedings
that rely on principles of fairness and equity and turn on whether a
broker made a “recommendation”. All of these uncertainties presumably are priced into the transactions between a broker and an institutional customer, resulting in higher transaction costs.
In order to address the potential moral hazard and the uncertainties
under the current scheme, one proposal that might be considered is the
implementation of a safe harbor for brokers that provide recommendations to certain institutional investors and sophisticated individuals.137
Under this proposal, if the broker has not provided any materially false
or misleading information or omitted material information, then that
broker’s recommendation of a financial product – coupled with complete and truthful disclosure of all the risks – to an institutional or
sophisticated customer should not be subjected to subsequent scrutiny in
arbitration. Indeed, in some situations, an institutional investor and
sophisticated individual may understand the financial product as well, if
not better than, the broker making the recommendation. 138
A safe harbor for broker recommendations to institutional investors
and sophisticated individual investors would be analogous in some
respects to the private offering exemptions under the Securities Act of
1933. 139 An institutional investor and high net-worth individual (exceeding a certain income or asset threshold) could be precluded from
bringing an unsuitability claim based on a recommendation of an investment, provided the broker did not make any material misstatements
or omit material facts concerning the investment. An additional requirement based on the number of years of investment experience could be
added to the safe harbor for individual investors in order to address concerns that income and net worth do not necessarily correlate with investment sophistication.
Moreover, to meet the safe harbor, brokers could be required to
provide a uniform disclosure document with detailed warnings that, in
137. The author takes no position on whether such proposal ultimately should be
adopted. Rather, this proposal should be carefully evaluated and studied, along with
other potential alternatives.
138. See, e.g., Banca Cremi, 132 F.3d at 1029 (rejecting plaintiff-bank’s argument
that it is not a sophisticated investor).
139. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501, et seq.; see also SEC, Accredited Investors, http://www.
sec.gov/answers/accred.htm; SEC, Rule 506 of Regulation D, http://www.sec.gov/
answers/rule506.htm.
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effect, instruct the investors on the safe harbor and strongly encourage
the investor to seek independent counsel and advice. Finally, the safe
harbor for institutional customers could be limited to recommendations
to a subset of institutional investors that are particularly well-equipped
to assess the risk of their investment such as large financial institutions
and corporations. The safe harbor would not apply to a broker’s recommendations to institutional investors that have specific legal constraints
regarding their types of investments.
There are potential benefits of a safe harbor that should be evaluated. First, a safe harbor likely would decrease the number of claims
brought in litigation and arbitration by customers that presumably can
fend for themselves regarding their investment decisions. Second, a safe
harbor might encourage institutional investors to hire personnel with the
requisite skills and expertise to evaluate complex investment products.
In effect, it would incentivize institutional investors to conduct thorough
due diligence to “self-police” their own investment decisions.140
Conversely, it would create a disincentive for institutional investors to
invest in high-risk instruments that could result in significant losses.
Third, by creating an incentive to self-police, a safe harbor likely would
reduce reliance on third-party ratings. Some commentators have pointed
to third-party ratings as a culprit in the current subprime crisis, arguing
that MBSs and CDOs are so complex that investors relied blindly on
credit ratings. 141 By placing greater emphasis on firm due diligence, the
safe harbor may have a secondary effect of reducing reliance on thirdparty ratings.
A safe harbor does not come without costs. Some commentators
have criticized similar safe-harbor approaches tied to investor wealth or
sophistication as creating an unfair shift in responsibility. 142 They argue
that sophisticated investors deserve protection under the federal securities laws from intentionally or recklessly fraudulent conduct by a broker.
As the Second Circuit explained forty years ago, “a salesman cannot
deliberately ignore that which he has a duty to know and recklessly state
140. Self-policing is not a substitute for vigorous enforcement of the securities laws
by regulators.
141. See, e.g., Opening Statement of Chairman Henry A. Waxman, Hearing of the
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. H. of Reps. (Oct. 22, 2008),
available at http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=2255; John Birger, The woman
who called Wall Street’s meltdown, FORTUNE, Aug. 6, 2008, available at http://money.
cnn.com/2008/08/04/magazines/fortune/whitney_feature.fortune/index.htm.
142. See Poser, supra note 127.
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facts about matters of which he is ignorant. . . . The fact that his
customers may be sophisticated and knowledgeable does not warrant a
less stringent standard”. 143
The concerns of those commentators, however, may be addressed in
part by fashioning a safe harbor that is limited to recommendations not
involving material misstatements or omissions. By limiting the safe
harbor to merely the recommendations by brokers (and not any misstatements or omissions), the safe harbor might serve to prevent brokers from
becoming insurers for the choices of their institutional customers,
thereby reducing the moral hazard observed under the current system.
The anticipated result would be that institutional clients would make
more careful investment decisions, hopefully avoiding another reoccurrence of the types of losses that occurred in the 1994 CMO crash and the
recent subprime mortgage crisis. 144
A safe harbor for certain institutional customers does not foreclose
the possibility that institutional customers and broker-dealers will “opt
in” to an arrangement of added protection. Presumably, sophisticated
parties are able to fend for themselves.
Institutional customers and broker-dealers can agree to contract
terms that are mutually beneficial and that allocate the risks in a transparent and predictable fashion. In some instances, institutional customers may contract for additional protection and incur additional transaction costs. In other instances, institutional customers may contract for
less protection and incur less cost. The ultimate level of protection
would be determined on the front end, which in turn would help guide
the level of diligence required by the institutional customer.
V. CONCLUSION
As the subprime mortgage crisis continues to unfold, there will be a
substantial increase in the number of claims brought by customers

143. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (“The speculators and chartists of Wall
Street and Bay Street are also ‘reasonable’ investors entitled to the same legal
protections afforded conservative traders.”).
144. There are undoubtedly other costs and benefits associated with a safe harbor
that cannot be contemplated without a thorough study. Therefore, a full analysis of all
the costs and benefits would be required before any action is taken. This Article merely
presents some of the issues to be debated, and it does not advocate for a particular
outcome.
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alleging that brokers recommended unsuitable investments in MBSs and
CMOs. As with the 1994 CMO crash, there will be a significant number
of claims brought by institutional investors. These claims should
prompt regulators to reconsider the unsuitability doctrine as applied to
certain institutional customers. Creating a safe harbor for the recommendations of broker-dealers to certain institutional investors may encourage more careful review of investments by the institutional customers and may provide greater certainty to both institutional customers and
broker-dealers.

